Post 11: After the Seminar

The seminar turned out to be very sucessful and enlightening. For those interested in knowing more about it please visit the following sites for our press release (PDF), photos from the event and the transcript of Dr. Andersen's talk.

We have also provided a video of the seminar below.

Post 10: Why this Seminar?

Energy security is critical to the development, security and integrity of every country. In India, a rapidly developing free and democratic behemoth, this assumes an even greater importance. Towards securing our energy needs, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the US-India Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement on the 2^nd of March, 2006. The deal guarantees India access to nuclear fuel and other related technologies that will help India develop her civilian nuclear program to an extent that would not only help reduce India’s dependence on foreign oil and gas, but also go a long way in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. India on her part has agreed to open up 14 of 22 nuclear reactors to IAEA inspections and ensure that there is complete separation of the civilian and military programs. The historic agreement was subsequently endorsed by several countries (including Russia, UK, France and Japan) and the IAEA whose Director Mohd ElBaradei said the agreement would be "a step forward towards universalization of the international safeguards regime" and make India "an important partner in the non-proliferation regime."

As with any visionary step, there are critics of this agreement whose main arguments center on a supposition that the deal would weaken the non-proliferation agreement and that it might lead to an arms race in the South Asian region.

On the contrary, the agreement brings India into the nonproliferation mainstream and addresses her growing energy needs through increased use of nuclear energy in cooperation with the international community. India's plan to separate her civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs will allow other nations to cooperate with India's civilian facilities to expand energy production. Those facilities will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to prevent diversion of technology and materials to India's military program. Greater use of nuclear reactors to produce energy for the Indian people will therefore not undermine regional security or stability. Hence the idea of a nuclear arms race is quite unfounded.

India, though not a signatory to the NPT, has never proliferated unlike some countries that happen to be signatories of the NPT. Through this initiative, India will enter the international nonproliferation mainstream, and thereby play a vital role in enhancing international security and stability. Hence the implementation of the US-India civil nuclear agreement will advance the objectives of nuclear nonproliferation by opening the door to India’s participation in the global non-proliferation regime rather than weakening it.

DESI and USIBC are organizing the seminar to help disseminate information about the deal and answer a lot more questions by providing a forum for discussions about the deal, which has now been introduced in both the Congress (H.R.4974) and the Senate (S.2429). As U.S. residents one can write to their elected representatives in support of the nuclear deal (H.R.4974 and S.2429 in Congressional and Senatorial parlance) through either the US-India Friendship Council (http://capwiz.com/usindiafriendshipcouncil/home/) or the US-India Friendship Network (http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/writeyourreps.htm).

Post 9: Nuclear Deal: Countering The FA(llaciou)S Arguments

Originally posted on 04.03.06 by Cynical Nerd

The highly respected Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in a ludicrous grass-roots campaign urges American citizens to write to their representatives to vote against the Indo-US nuclear deal:

The FAS enthusiastically supports much stronger ties with the world’s largest democracy. There are myriad areas in which cooperation between India and the United States should be improved, including trade, technology, education, and security. Nuclear trade is unnecessary and ill-advised.

FAS of all people should be aware that without access to affordable energy India’s growth will be stifled.. At present nuclear energy contributes only 3% of India’s power generation. In the absence of alternate energy sources and till the thorium cycle takes over, it will be forced to construct even more thermal power reactors using proven sanction-free, home grown technologies and large domestic coal reserves. In fact, for India this is a much safer option since each mega thermal plant which India plans to construct with a 4000 MW rating is the equivalent of 2.5-4 modern nuclear power plants (Westinghouse’s AP1000 reactor’s capacity is around 1100 MW, while GE’s N-series reactors has a rating of up to 1500 MW and Areva’s third generation EPR reactors can generate up to 1600 MW)

But does the FAS, well aware of the greenhouse gas effects, still wants India to burn even more fossil fuels? As Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said, all this talk of strong cooperation in other areas will fall flat if this deal fails to get approved.

Allowing India to bypass the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) weakens the entire international non-proliferation effort. While the NPT is not perfect, it should be strengthened, not undermined.

China exploded its first weapon in 1964, and India did so in 1974. Between the dates, the NPT went into effect in 1968. Despite not being allowed to sign the NPT as a nuclear weapons state, India has been scrupulous in ensuring that its weapons material and technology are guarded against commercial or illicit export to other countries while China displayed no such scruples.

We have spent much time and energy in writing about the blatant proliferation which occurred from NPT signatories of Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland to Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. A.Q. Khan’s stolen designs and fabricated parts ended up in Iran, North Korea and Libya – all NPT signatories. Further damning allegations have been revealed recently when a whopping 41 German firms have been raided for having shipping centrifuge parts to Iran via Russia, long after the supposed ‘dismantling’ of the Khan network.

In addition, FAS accompanies this petition with an easy to use letter template which can then be electronically mailed to respective Congressmen:

Much was made of the Indian nuclear “deal” but there isn’t really a deal, yet. President Bush and Prime Minister Singh agreed — in principle — to develop a nuclear technology trade agreement, but the details must be worked out over months. Normally, any agreement would be subject to Congressional review. But H. R. 4974 makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to object to whatever the deal turns out to be. In essence, the Congress is being asked to approve a nuclear trade agreement with India months in advance, sight unseen.

I ask you to vote against H. R. 4974, which grants pre-approval to a nuclear technology trade deal with India. We don’t even know now what that deal will include but this bill would make Congressional review impossible.

This is a ridiculous claim. Hundreds of articles have been churned out in Indian and American media analyzing this deal in every possible angle. Even as a non-specialist, this blogger has been able to write several articles on the subject from available open source information. We expect several Congressional testimonies seeking more details in the coming weeks with some including classified briefings from experts and policy makers. So where is the question of not knowing anything about this deal?

I believe that a nuclear technology trade agreement with India is contrary to the long-term security of the United States, India, and the world.

FAS is clearly off the mark since it has no business to talk about the long-term security of India. India’s minimal strategic program poses no threat to the United States. Rather, the danger for U.S. and her allies lies in Iran getting their hands on nuclear weapons technologies with origins in Pakistan, China and Germany. This organization with objectives of serious non-partisan research and education in national security and non-proliferation issues is shamefully getting involved in knee-jerk political activism with little regard for facts.

We believe that the United States should withhold nuclear cooperation from India and work vigorously with other nuclear powers to dramatically reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons.

How come FAS doesn’t have anything to say about the China signing a Uranium deal with Australia even with declaring only two nuclear facilities under safeguards despite its worst proliferation record in direct violation of Article I of the NPT (link ironically from FAS). Contrast that with India’s offer of opening up 14 of the existing 22 reactors in addition to committing all future civil reactors under international safeguards. If FAS is really interested in controlling proliferation, it should:

• Demand the Pakistani government to allow the I.A.E.A. to interrogate A.Q. Khan
• Investigate German and other European firms still involved in the proliferation racket
• Lobby the Congress to review the nuclear agreement it signed with China

Let your thoughts known to FAS at membership@fas.org with “Petition Feedback” as subject and to its non-proliferation expert Dr. Ivan Oelrich at ioelrich@fas.org

U.S. residents can further write to their elected representatives in support of the nuclear deal (H.R. 4974 and S. 2429 in Congressional and Senatorial parlance) through either of the U.S.-India friendship groups here and here. A personalized postal letter with full return address usually carries more weight than an electronic mail.

Post 8: Indo-US N-deal a historic opportunity

Sridhar Krishnaswami in Washington | March 22, 2006 18:37 IST

Observing that the Indo-US nuclear deal will foster deeper strategic ties that will yield significant commercial opportunities, the Chamber of Commerce has urged Capitol Hill to support the draft legislation on the pact, sent to the Congress last week.

In separate letters to Senator Daniel Akaka and Congressman Neil Abercrombie of the
House of Representatives, Chamber President and Chief Executive Officer Thomas
Donahue urged the two lawmakers to not only back the legislation but also co-sponsor it.

The US-India Business Council celebrates its 31st anniversary this year. Urging the two lawmakers to back and co-sponsor legislation S 2429 in the Senate and H.R.4974 in the House, Donahue said, "In our collective view, this is a historic opportunity that rarely comes and must not be lost. We strongly urge you to co-sponsor and support this legislation."

The lawmakers have been told that if the US forgoes the economic opportunity as a result of this civilian nuclear energy agreement, those benefits will go to the competition.

"The US Chamber of Commerce wholly supports the transformed strategic partnership
between the United States and India as embodied in the historic July 18 Joint statement signed by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which calls for civilian nuclear cooperation," Donahue said.

"American business leaders are united in their belief that civilian nuclear cooperation with India will foster deeper strategic ties that will yield significant commercial opportunities for US companies," the head of the Chamber, representing more than three million businesses and organisations of various size, sector and region, said.

India's energy requirements through 2012 require investments of more than $170 billion. American firms look forward to providing equipment, services and technology to assist India in meeting its energy security needs, he said.

"India's nuclear power requirements are projected to generate as many as 27,000 high-
quality jobs each year for the next ten years in the US nuclear industry alone. If the US forgoes this opportunity, these benefits will go to the competition," Donahue said.

Also, by assisting India in its nuclear power development, international inspection will ensure application of world-class safety standards and provide an inspection regime where there had been none before. "This will make the world safer and more secure," he said.

Finally the environment will be protected to the extent India generates clean nuclear powerrather than relying on fossil fuel or the burning of high ash coal, he said.

"In all of these areas, US companies will prove helpful partners, generating jobs and
prosperity in the US as well as in India. Over the course of our long-term engagement as a Chamber with India, we have come to understand the primacy of trust and respect that is at the core of our partnership. These are the same core values at stake in the Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation initiative," he added.

Post 7: Indo-US nuclear deal: Support in Senate

Senator Richard Lugar, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that will review the deal, has said that despite doubts about the agreement in various quarters, he feels "a majority of members of the Senate... are probably going to come down on the side of the legislation" once their concerns are addressed.

A preliminary estimate made by lobbying groups suggests that the deal has majority support in the 18-member Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), with very few law-makers inclined to oppose it.

Besides Lugar, nine other Republican Senators on the Committee are said to favor the deal. They are Senators Chuck Hagel, Lincoln Chafeee, George Allen, Norm Coleman, George Voinovich, Lamar Alexander, John Sununu, Lisa Murkowski and Mel Martinez.

Among the eight Democratic Senators on the Committee, Senators John Kerry and Ranking Member Joe Biden have indicated they are okay with the deal if theirs doubts are addressed. There is no hard core resistance among six other Democratic senators -- Paul Sarbanes, Christopher Dodd, Russ Feingold, Barbara Boxer, Bill Nelson and Barack Obama.

Post 6: Replies to the Baseless ISIS Report by Albright

Nitin Pai

Indian Maverick


Kaushik Kapisthalam gives an excellent reply to the baseless allegations put forth in David Albright's flawed ISIS report. Also published at World Peace Herald & the United Press International.

Post 5: Our Opportunity With India - By Condoleezza Rice

A very interesting and informative opinion piece written by the Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice.

Post 4: An Open Letter to Congress from Leading Experts in Different Fields

An open letter to the Members of Congress from a group of eminent scholars, diplomats and former US Government officials calling for an endorsement of the India- US civil nuclear cooperation agreement.

Washington, DC
March 10, 2006

The Administration will soon present to the Congress a request for action to implement the agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh providing for civilian nuclear cooperation with India. The signatories to this letter urge your support for the necessary legislation. This recommendation is based on our extensive experience and expertise relating to non-proliferation policy, security issues in Asia, the domestic economic and political environment in India and India-U.S. relations.

Congress should support the agreement to promote U.S. strategic interests, U.S. non-proliferation goals, U.S. energy security and global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions leading to global warming. Failure to implement it would be a body blow to the development of the strong relationship with India so important to achieving U.S. goals in Asia and beyond. We present herewith the case for the agreement and our response to the arguments put forward in Congressional testimony by critics of the accord.

As Mohammed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said following the President’s visit to New Delhi, “this agreement is an important step towards satisfying India’s growing need for energy. It would also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime… It would be a step forward toward universalization of the international safeguards regime.”

The Strategic Case

The implementation of this agreement is necessary to promote a strategic partnership with a dynamic, self-reliant India that is playing an increasingly significant regional and global security role. Such a partnership has already begun to develop as a natural consequence of shared democratic values, compatible market economies, growing technological interdependence and a congruence of geopolitical interests. Extending this partnership to cooperation in civilian nuclear technology has now become urgent. With its population now past one billion, India needs a massive expansion of its civilian nuclear program in order to cope with an escalating energy shortage that could in time threaten its economic and political stability.

Against the background of China’s rise, including the projected expansion of its naval reach in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, a strong, stable India will advance the traditional U.S. objective of an Asian balance of power in which no one nation is able to exercise overwhelming dominance. Since both the United States and India are seeking constructive relations with China, neither Washington nor New Delhi wants their new partnership to become an anti-Beijing security alliance. At the same time, as a series of joint naval exercises have shown, the U.S. and Indian navies are positioned for growing cooperation from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. In the event of disruptions in the movement of critical energy supplies through Asian sealanes resulting from wars or piracy, this cooperation will enhance the ability of the United States to respond effectively. Apart from such direct military cooperation, the United States and India have a common strategic stake in combating Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Two previous administrations have attempted to move toward a strategic partnership with India while keeping in quarantine any dealings related to civilian nuclear technology or dual-use technology with possible applications to Indian nuclear or missile programs. This approach has failed because India, a subcontinental giant with a middle class larger than the combined population of France, Germany and Britain, is endowed with a wealth of indigenous talent in science and technology and feels confident that it will achieve major power status with or without external help.

The Non-Proliferation Case

Implementation of the US-India civil nuclear agreement will advance the objectives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by opening the door to India’s participation in the global non-proliferation regime. Contrary to the Congressional testimony of some specialists:



*

The NPT does not bar the United States and other signatory nations from providing civilian nuclear technology under safeguards to non-signatories such as India. It is for this reason that the United Kingdom, France and Russia have endorsed the agreement. Congress went beyond the NPT by requiring safeguards on all of a country’s nuclear installations as a condition of U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation. This has had consequences that conflict directly with U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States can sell civilian nuclear reactors to China, which signed the NPT but has supplied nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. At the same time, the United States has barred such sales to India, which did not sign the NPT but has never transferred nuclear technology to others.

The technical and legal justification put forward for this paradoxical result is that China’s 1964 test took place before the cutoff date for classification as a “nuclear weapons state” specified in the NPT, while India’s 1974 and 1998 tests did not.

We recognize that critics of the agreement have legitimate concerns about possible unintended consequences that cannot be foreseen. On balance, however, we believe that such concerns are less compelling than the clear, tangible, immediate benefits to the non-proliferation regime that will result from the agreement.
*

The agreement will expand safeguards coverage of the Indian nuclear program by requiring India to place all existing and projected reactors designated by India as civilian under international safeguards in perpetuity. Initially, India insisted that reactors built without foreign involvement be exempt from safeguards, but withdrew this proviso during the negotiations with President Bush. These safeguards will remain in force in perpetuity and will be linked to assurances of continued supply for safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities. With or without U.S. help, India will be forced by burgeoning population growth to expand civilian nuclear power exponentially for electricity generation, and it is important to bring this expanded capacity under international inspection.
*

Prime Minister Singh has fulfilled his commitment in the accord that India would “identify and separate civilian and nuclear facilities in a phased manner.” After bitter internal battles with nuclear nationalists in India, the Prime Minister has presented a credible eight-year timetable designating which of India’s existing nuclear facilities are now restricted to nuclear power generation, which ones will be shifted over to civilian purposes at specified stages, and which ones will be left for military use. India’s nuclear hawks wanted a much shorter civilian list. By 2014, 65 percent of India’s existing installed thermal nuclear capacity, 14 of 22 reactors, will be restricted to civilian purposes. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns stated on March 2, safeguards will apply to all future civilian power reactors, thermal reactors and “breeder reactors that are classified as civilian” by India. The reactors to be placed under safeguards include several that India built with its own know-how and resources. In the past it has refused to place them under safeguards, but will do so now in order to be able to get foreign fuel and components.

Critics object to the fact that the agreement gives India the freedom to build new military reactors and exempts key research and development facilities with a military potential from safeguards, such as any breeder reactors not classified as civilian. Given the magnitude and projected growth of its energy needs, however, India appears likely in its own self-interest to use fast-breeder reactors it may subsequently build for civilian purposes, as its current plans envisage.

Another often-expressed objection is that the agreement will enable India to use its indigenous uranium for military reactors, since civilian reactors will be able to rely increasingly on imported uranium fuel. But as The Washington Post has pointed out, “leaving a potentially large plutonium-making program outside the scope of multilateral inspections is not a setback relative to the status quo,” since India would have been free to continue making as many nuclear weapons as it deemed necessary regardless of the July accord, using breeder reactors as well as uranium-fueled reactors.

The critics object to the very concept of a civilian-military separation plan that implicitly acknowledges the military component of the Indian nuclear program. But this acknowledgement was long-overdue. India has been a de facto nuclear weapons state since 1974, and U.S. policy under two administrations has already given de facto recognition to this reality.
*

Critics also argue that the accord will lead countries that accepted the NPT and gave up their own nuclear aspirations to consider reactivating their weapons programs. In our view, what could put pressure on these countries is not the deal with India but the geopolitical situation in their own regions. Thus, Brazil and Argentina would appear unlikely to reopen their NPT adherence, and should, in any case, have access to nuclear technology, given their compliance to date with Article One.

By contrast, North Korea, an NPT signatory, says it has developed nuclear weapons, pointing to perceived security threats that have nothing to do with the U.S.-India agreement. Similarly, if South Korea, Taiwan or Japan were to convert their U.S.-aided civilian nuclear programs to weapons development, it would not be in response to the agreement but to changing geopolitical factors.

Finally, critics believe that the bargain with India may invite countries that already have nuclear weapons, like North Korea and Pakistan, or are seeking to develop a nuclear weapons option, like Iran, to demand equal treatment. But India’s record of observing Article One stands in sharp contrast to Pakistan’s role as a wholesale proliferator and to the failure of Iran and North Korea to abide by their International Atomic Energy Agency commitments.
*

The agreement will strengthen India’s commitment to participating in international efforts to prevent proliferation. India has not exported nuclear material or technology, but because it has been treated as an object of suspicion by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other nonproliferation institutions, it has not directly participated in their work. The agreement not only commits India formally to align its export rules and practices with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group: it also opens the way for Indian participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and in efforts to guard against nuclear leakage. India’s decision to support the majority in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s recent vote to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council shows how important this enhanced nonproliferation posture can be.

The Energy Security Case

The agreement opens the way for India to meet its energy needs in ways that will advance long-term U.S. energy security goals. At present India gets only 2.6 percent of its electricity from nuclear power, but it is likely to increase this percentage at least ten fold in the next two decades. Even if it only gets part way toward this goal, this would be a significant reduction in its potential need for oil and gas, most of it now obtained from the Persian Gulf.

As more and more Indians drive automobiles, its demand for oil is rapidly growing. India will increasingly be competing with the United States and other consumers for petroleum from the Gulf and other sources. President Bush emphasized energy security in his press conference with Prime Minister Singh at the conclusion of his recent visit to India. “Congress has got to understand,” he said, “that it is in our economic interest that India have a civilian nuclear power industry to help take the pressure off the global demand for energy. Increasing demand for oil from America, from India and China, related to a supply that is not keeping up with the demand, causes our fuel prices to go up and so to the extent that we can reduce the demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer. This is what I’ll be telling our Congress.”

The Global Warming Case

As India industrializes, its greenhouse gas emissions are steadily increasing, making it one of the world’s major polluters, albeit far behind the United States. India, like China, argues that it is in a developmental stage, seeking to catch up with more advanced industrial powers, and cannot be held to the same standard as the developed countries in any global warming agreement. To the extent that India shifts away from fossil fuels, its negative impact on global warming will be reduced, and the prospects for international limitations on greenhouse gas emissions will improve.

To sum up, the arguments made against the agreement are outweighed by the arguments in its favor. Civilian nuclear cooperation with India will strengthen its political and economic stability; further U.S. strategic interests, U.S. non-proliferation goals and U.S. energy security, and help to combat the growing danger posed to mankind by global warming.

This letter reflects the personal views of the undersigned and does not represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.

SELIG S. HARRISON
Convenor

Director
Asia Program
Center for International Policy
Senior Scholar
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

WALTER ANDERSEN

Associate Director, South Asia Studies
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
Former Director for South Asia
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

GARY K. BERTSCH

Director
Center for International Trade and Security
University of Georgia
University Professor of Public and International Affairs
University of Georgia

MARSHALL BOUTON

President
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Former Director for Policy Analysis, Near East and South Asia
Department of Defense

HONORABLE WILLIAM CLARK

Former U.S. Ambassador to India
Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

STEPHEN P. COHEN

Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution
Former Member, Policy Planning Council
Department of State

THOMAS DONNELLY

Resident Fellow in Defense and National Security
American Enterprise Institute
Member, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

AINSLEE EMBREE

Professor Emeritus of History and former Director of the Southern Asian Institute
Columbia University
Special Consultant to U.S. Ambassador to India Frank Wisner

HAROLD GOULD

Visiting Scholar
University of Virginia

LEONARD G. GORDON

Senior Research Associate
Southern Asian Institute
Columbia University

FREDERIC GRARE

Visiting Scholar
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Former Counselor for Cooperation and Culture
Embassy of France, Islamabad, Pakistan

ROBERT M. HATHAWAY

Director, Asia Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
South Asia specialist, Foreign Affairs Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives

WALTER HAUSER

Professor Emeritus of South Asian History
University of Virginia

HONORABLE KARL F. INDERFURTH

Director, International Affairs Programs
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
Former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs

ROBERT KAGAN

Senior Fellow
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

HONORABLE DENNIS KUX

Senior Scholar
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Former U.S. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast

EDWARD LUTTWAK

Senior Advisor
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Former consultant to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council
The State Department and the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force.


MCKIMM MARRIOTT

Professor Emeritus of South Asian Anthropology
Department of Anthropology
University of Chicago

LLOYD RUDOLPH

The University of Chicago

SUSANNE RUDOLPH

William Benton Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science Emerita
The University of Chicago

HONORABLE HOWARD SCHAFFER

Deputy Director
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Georgetown University
Former U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh

HONORABLE TERESITA C. SCHAFFER

Director, South Asia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs
Former U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka

HONORABLE FRANK WISNER

Former U.S. Ambassador to India

Post 3: The Official White House Response

India Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics

CRITICS: The U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal will accelerate the nuclear arms race in South Asia.

COUNTERPOINT: This is an historic agreement that brings India into the nonproliferation mainstream and addresses its growing energy needs through increased use of nuclear energy in cooperation with the international community. The United States has no intention of aiding India's nuclear weapons program. India's plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs will allow other nations to cooperate with India's civilian facilities to expand energy production. Those facilities will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to prevent diversion of technology and materials to India's military program. Greater use of nuclear reactors to produce energy for the Indian people will not undermine regional security or stability.

CRITICS: Doesn't this initiative effectively recognize India as a nuclear weapons state?

COUNTERPOINT: No, the United States has not recognized India as a nuclear weapons state. The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) defines a nuclear weapons state as "one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." (The United States, UK, France, Russia, and China exploded nuclear devices prior to that date.) India does not meet this definition, and we do not seek to amend the Treaty.

CRITICS: Only 14 of India's 22 nuclear power reactors will be safeguarded under its separation plan, and India's two developmental fast breeder reactors will remain unsafeguarded. With these facilities, India can produce enough nuclear weapons to significantly expand its current arsenal.

COUNTERPOINT: The understanding we have reached with India will significantly increase the number of Indian nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards, as well as bring associated facilities under safeguards. At present, only four of India's nuclear power reactors are under safeguards. Under its civil-military separation plan, India has agreed to place the majority of its existing nuclear power reactors and those under construction under safeguards and to place the other associated upstream and downstream facilities that support those reactors under safeguards. Furthermore, India has committed to place all future civilian power and fast breeder reactors under safeguards.

This agreement is good for American security because it will bring India's civilian nuclear program into the international nonproliferation mainstream. The agreement also is good for the American economy because it will help meet India's surging energy needs - and that will lessen India's growing demand for other energy supplies and help restrain energy prices for American consumers.

CRITICS: Doesn't this initiative create a double standard and won't it encourage rogue nations like North Korea and Iran to continue to pursue nuclear weapons programs?

COUNTERPOINT: It is not credible to compare the rogue regimes of North Korea and Iran to India. Unlike Iran or North Korea, India has been a peaceful and vibrant democracy with a strong nuclear nonproliferation record.

Under this initiative, India - which has never been a party to the NPT - has agreed to take a series of steps that will bring it into the international nonproliferation mainstream.

Iran and North Korea are very different cases. They signed and ratified the NPT and gave lip service to adhering to their international obligations. Through their covert actions, however, they broke the very nonproliferation commitments they claimed to follow. Additionally, both regimes have isolated themselves from the international community and are state sponsors of terrorism.

India, on the other hand, has agreed to take steps that will bring it into the nonproliferation mainstream, including:

* Placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and monitoring;
* Signing and implementing the Additional Protocol, which allows more extensive inspections by the IAEA;
* Ensuring that its nuclear materials and technologies are secured and prevented from diversion, including its recent passage of a law to create a robust national export control system;
* Refraining from transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess them and supporting efforts to limit their spread;
* Working to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty;
* Continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing; and
* Adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

CRITICS: This initiative will weaken or unravel the global nonproliferation regime. Creating an exception for India will lead Pakistan and Israel, who are also outside the NPT regime, to insist on a similar deal or cause other nations to withdraw from the Treaty.

COUNTERPOINT: India has stood outside the global nonproliferation regime for the last 30 years. Through this initiative, India will enter the international nonproliferation mainstream, thereby strengthening the regime that continues to play a vital role in enhancing international security and stability.

All nations that are party to the NPT are permitted full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes but are prohibited from pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons (except for the five recognized nuclear weapons states). We do not expect nations to withdraw from the NPT. Any move to withdraw from the NPT would clearly signal a nation's intent to pursue nuclear weapons and would result in the loss of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. Our relationship with Pakistan, which has Major Non-NATO Ally status, follows a separate path that reflects our countries' strong commitment to maintaining close ties and cooperation, including in the War on Terror. However, Pakistan does not have the same nonproliferation record as India, nor the same energy needs. We do not intend to pursue a similar civil nuclear cooperation initiative with Pakistan.

The status of Israel is not comparable to that of India. Israel has not declared itself to be a nuclear power, nor articulated such extraordinary energy needs. As for other Middle Eastern countries, we expect all NPT parties to live up to their treaty obligations.

Post 2: Rejoinders to Thomas Friedman

Thomas Friedman in a recent New York Times article gave a mistaken interpretation of the historic India-US Nuclear deal. We have provided the views of several experts who correct this misconception.

REJOINDER # 1 by India's strategic affairs guru, K Subrahmanyam

Nuclear Ayatollahs

K Subrahmanyam

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times is known in this country as a great friend and admirer of our democracy and a strong advocate of outsourcing of tasks related to Information Technology to India. Therefore one regrets to find he chose to accept the biased information supplied by a fellow American, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Disarmament, Robert Einhorn, instead of outsourcing his query to India and then basing his advice on the information gathered thereby.. He wants India to stop further fissile materials production in order to get exceptionalisation from the Nonproliferation Treaty.This view is based on Einhorn's information that all nuclear powers, including China have stopped
fissile materiala production. Robert Einhorn served in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from 1972 to 1984, in the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department from 1986-92, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State1992-99 and Assistant Secretary of State
from 1999-2000.

It was during his tenure in ACDA, China concluded its treaty with Z. A. Bhutto in June 1976 to proliferate nuclear weapons to Pakistan. The US formally agreed to look away from this proliferation in 1982, during the talks between the Pakistani delegation led by Agha Shahi
and US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. During this period Dr. A. Q. Khan dealt with China and obtained the Chinese design of the bomb. According to the very recent disclosures of the Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, CIA interceded twice in 1976 and 1985 with the Dutch
government to save Dr. A. Q. Khan from prosecution. The Pakistanis assembled their bomb in 1987 and the US delayed acknowledging Pakistani bomb-making till 1990.

The Chinese supplied M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan from late 80s. Though Pakistani government acknowledged the receipt of the missiles in 1983 in its Senate, the Clinton Administration (with Robert Einhorn as Deputy Assistant Secretary) maintained for seven long
years, till a couple of months before Clinton demitted office, that the State Department was yet to make a determination on the receipt of Chinese missiles in Pakistan. In 1994 the transfer of 5000 ring magnets to sustain the Pakistani centrifuge operations took place from China . This was a deliberate violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and yet the US readily accepted the Chinese explanation that this transaction was without the permission of Chinese Central
Government.

From 1987 onwards, Dr. A. Q. Khan had initiated his proliferation to Iran. Gen. Aslam Beg, the Pakistani Army Chief, at that time informed two Assistant Secretaries of State, Harry Rowan and Henri Sokolski, that Pakistan would be compelled to share nuclear technology with Iran in view of US sanctions on Islamabad.. Dr. A. Q. Khan's proliferation to Iran continued from 1987 – 2002 and during this period Robert Einhorn was on watch in the State Department on arms control and nuclear proliferation. China also supplied equipment and materials to Iran for its nuclear weapons programme. The Chinese drawings on bomb design were recovered from Libya and till today there is no explanation from the Chinese. While the US has conveyed
its displeasure to Pakistan on its refusal to make available Dr. A. Q. Khan for interrogation no one has raised the issue of asking the Chinese to explain their proliferation.. China continues to construct two nuclear power reactors in Pakistan. In India there are concerns that under the cover of reactor construction China continues its proliferation to Pakistan.

Given this history, nuclear proliferation Ayatollahs like Robert Einhorn, Henri Sokolski, Harry Rowan, Strobe Talbott and the entire Clinton Administration command very little credibility in India. If China had stopped its fissile material production,as Einhorn maintains , why does it not make a formal declaration or join in initiating discussions on concluding the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty? Most of these Ayatollahs have spent a lifetime shielding China and Pakistan and finding excuses for the tolerant attitude of past US Administrations for the most blatant proliferation campaign by China-Pakistan axis.

Even according to the most critical estimate by US Strategic community, India over the last 16 years has built up around 95-100 warheads – approximately 5-6 weapons per year. India at that stage
was not bound by the norms of Nonproliferation Treaty and had all its indigenous reactors out of safeguards. Now India will be in the nonproliferation regime, though not as a member of NPT, and India is keen on cultivating the goodwill of all friendly nuclear powers. The world today is a balance of power in which prospects of violent conflict among major nations are becoming ever rarer. But India adjoins a failing state, an epicenter of terrorism which has a live proliferation link with China.

India lives in a dangerous neighborhood and has to sustain its democracy in a region where there are major non-democratic states that have a record of proliferation over the last two decades. In such circumstances the credible minimum deterrent of India should not
lose its credibility. The pace of build-up of minimum deterrent by India till now has been very restrained in spite of frequent Pakistani provocative testing of its nuclear-capable missiles
obtained from China and North Korea.

Thomas Friedman shoud obtain a detailed account of US policy towards proliferation from China to Pakistan and through it to Iran, Libya and North Korea from those who were in charge and come to hardheaded conclusions. China does not acknowledge that it has stopped fissile material production but is able to mobilize enough American nuclear Ayatollahs to proclaim to the world its nuclear virtues. There is a Hindi proverb, which fits this context. After eating one hundred mice the cat went on its Hajj pilgrimage.

*******************************************************************

REJOINDER # 2 by Anupam Srivastava, Director of the Asia Program at
the Center for International Trade & Security, University of Georgia.


Friedman has mixed the arguments -- not surprising because he's not a domain expert. And is relying on Einhorn -- whom I've known for years-- who's also making a selective and biased argument.

Here are the problems/issues:

1. Friedman opens by saying India should join the NPT. And ends by saying India should stop fissile material production. But how does stopping fissile production make India join the NPT? Can India join as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)? No. Can NPT be amended to make
India join as a NWS? No. That's why there's been this stalemate for 30 years. And the Bush Deal found a way out of it -- by not formally recognizing India's nuclear weapons capability -- simply "separating" it from the civilian complex and making inernational particiption in
it possible.

2. A common mistake: NPT DOES NOT prohibit civil nuclear trade with a non-member or even a NNWS. It simply says recipient country's facility in which the assistance is going must be placed under safeguards --which will happen under the N deal.

3. FMCT: China has NOT stopped fissile materials production, nor confirmed it will do so -- has simply said it will sign/join the FMCT when it's ready -- which is exactly what India has also said. Both know that it will be 3 years or more before FMCT is finally negotiated at the CD in Geneva.

4. By then, India should have enough weapons grade fissile material. That is also why they insisted to keep FBRs in the weapons complex, and build additional FBR facilities on the civilian side -- so as to participate in global Nuclear R&D and supply initiatives (GNEP, Gen IV etc)

So, sadly, Friedman is wrong on this one -- probably because he has been coached by people with a vested interest.

Hope this clarifies the issues involved.

********************************************************************

REJOINDER # 3 by Ron Somers, President, United States-India Business
Council


From: Somers, Ron
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 12:46 PM
To: 'letters@nytimes.com'
Subject: Thomas Friedman Is Flat Wrong

March 8, 2006

Letters to the Editor,
The New York Times

Re: "Letting India in the Club" (Column by Thomas L. Friedman, March
8, 2006)
To the Editor:

The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prohibit the sharing of civilian nuclear technology with India, contrary to Thomas Friedman's insinuation.

In fact, the NPT encourages nuclear technology's peaceful use, and embracing India in this regard will actually advance the NPT's objectives.

President Bush's and Prime Minister Singh's landmark agreement promotes peaceful use of civilian nuclear technology, while preventing diversion of civilian technology to military use. This
explains Nobel laureate Mohammed El-Baradei's unequivocal support of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear initiative.

For the record, the United States has a civilian nuclear sharing agreement with nuclear-armed China. Mr. Friedman fails to explain why India, with a spotless non-proliferation record and strategic partner of the United States, should be treated less favorably than China.
Moreover, unlike Iran or North Korea, India has never violated the NPT.

The worry that Japan, Brazil, or Argentina might renounce their adherence to the NPT because of U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation with India is fanciful. None of the three or any other NPT party has uttered a syllable suggesting such nuclear adventurism is afoot because of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear initiative.

As regards a fissile material cut-off, India is committed to negotiating this by international treaty that would apply evenhandedly throughout the globe. India is sandwiched between nuclear-armed Pakistan and China. It cannot be expected to compromise its national security anymore than was the United States when confronted with Soviet missiles in Cuba.

To make fissile material cut-off the pre-condition to India joining the nuclear club is equivalent to killing the deal, and Thomas Friedman knows this. If this deal fails, India will remain outside
IAEA safeguards, the world will be less safe, and the budding strategic partnership between the United States and democratic India will be stillborn.

Fifty-four per cent (54%) of India's population is under the age of 25; this translates to 600 million young Indians who were not even born at the time of the signing of the NPT. President Bush has it right engaging India in its development of energy security. America's involvement will ensure transfer of international best practices and greater safety standards, while stemming global warming – with the indirect benefit of spurring job creation in India and here at home.

Ignoring 1/5th the world's population that supports the world's largest democracy, rule of law, and which embraces a vibrant and free press, secular values, and is aligned with the U.S. on numerous international geopolitical challenges, would prove a Himalayan blunder that belongs to the round-world thinking that we had hoped Thomas Friedman and others have outgrown.

Sincerely,

Ron Somers, President United States-India Business Council, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, 1615 H Street NW Washington, DC 20062,
202-463-5626


**********************************************************************
REJOINDER # 4 by Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Foreign Affairs Editor of THE
HINDUSTAN TIMES, New Delhi

The key problems with Friedman's piece.

1. Seems to have forgotten that India didn't sign the NPT because it essentially gave India a stark choice: if you want access to civilian nuclear technology than you must surrender your nuclear arsenal. He smartly leaves out that the NPT would have required India to
unilaterally disarm.

He quotes Bob Einhorn as urging that if India wants to be a nuclear power it should do what they do and apply a fissile material freeze.

Two subpoints here:

2. India has accepted strictures on its nuclear policy that the five nuclear powers do not: Safeguards on nuclear facilities are in perpetuity, the facilities cannot switch from nuclear to civilian and back. The deal is not one of perfect reciprocity.

3. He claims China has agreed to a fissile material freeze. This is highly contentious. Einhorn himself was asked in a closed door conference to provide any shred of evidence to prove this claim. He could not. There has been no official statement by China to this effect. When Einhorn was in the Clinton Administration he told Indian journalists that Pakistan was on the verge of overtaking India in terms of weapons grade plutonium production. Knowing this, it is remarkable he feels India should freeze its production at this point.


4. Finally, Friedman completely fails to understand how important the nuclear deal is to wiping out the deep institutional distrust of the US that exists in New Delhi. To say "I support Bush's new policy on India" and then say "but I oppose the nuclear deal" is an oxymoron.

Friedman seems to have only one source, Einhorn -- a nonproliferation hawk.

The column only proves the axiom in journalism that a one-source story is almost sure to be erroneous.


****************************************************************

REJOINDER # 5 by foreign policy specialist Indrani Bagchi of THE
TIMES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI

I think Tom Friedman needs some reality checks in this world. It also shows that no matter how much he says he likes india, he cannot possibly make Bob Einhorn his non-proliferation guru. Einhorn is the kind who is bloody-minded enough to say India should cap its fissile material, while not having the balls to get China or Pakistan to do the same. Einhorn in a conversation with me in 1999 actually said that Pakistan (then) had more fissile material than India. Clearly,
if he knew it, so did the Indian establishment. But since then, India has not made a push to ratchet up its own fissile materials production, which ought to say something about India, something that ayatollahs like Einhorn will never realise.

My disappointment with Friedman on this issue is profound. At least I would have expected him to think independently for himself rather than blindly be PR for Einhorn. And to think independently, one has to reorient one's mind from the round world to the flat. and Friedman
has leagues to go before that happens. ____________________________________________________

Cheers,

Ram Narayanan
US-India Friendship
http://www.usindiafriendship.net/
{http://www.usindiafriendship.net/ }